









HEC Paris  
Pernod Ricard Chair on the Management of Prestige Brands  
& 
Olivier Tabatoni  
Professor 


















SUMMARY OR ABSTRACT 
 
Although modest in terms of sales , compared to most other sectors, luxury  
does get a high share of investors’ , financial analysts’ and media attention . 
Why would this sector receive a share of attention much bigger than its actual 
weight ? Is it because of its glamourous image, or the incredible prices attached 
to its products , now displayed in all the media for mass desire ? Are the 
financiers dreaming too ?  
  3
An analysis of published financial accounts shows  that Luxury Groups’ 
performance does not appear exceptional. Companies from the 
internet economy exhibit much greater profitability. Of course not all luxury 
groups are equal : some, such Hermès, show outstanding financial performance 
but  many others do not. Though, luxury groups appear  to make financial 
market dream when considering their valuation multiple.  
What then fuels the dream ? First , the expectations based on these best of class 
companies . They make believe that their success can be emulated as long as one 
follows the discipline of a real luxury strategy .Another explanatory factor is 
that Luxury groups brand portfolios exhibit themselves a wide variance of 
results. Most brands are at pain, while some show remarkable results. It is these 
exceptions which carry the dream of the sector. Most investors do believe that, 
with flair and the right turn-around , each small or ailing luxury brand will have 
its chance. Just as Dior or Louis Vuitton were small and unexciting , once they 
were bought by LVMH they have now reached the sky and become the stars of 


















Is the luxury industry really a financier’s dream ? 
 
 
Although modest in terms of sales , compared to most other sectors,luxury  does get a high 
share of investors’ , financial analysts’ and media attention . Why would this sector receive a 
share of attention much bigger than its actual weight ? Is it because of the prestige attached 
to its major brands ,or the fact that financiers are themselves key clients of luxury and are 
amazed by the prices they pay ? The most often heard explanation is that luxury would be a 
financiers’ dream  and exhibit a very high profitability : this is why it is a beloved object of 
attention from investment groups , financial analysts and the medias  . 
But is luxury really a financiers‘ dream ? Beyond the shiny image of its groups and brands 
what is the reality of their financial performance ? The purpose of this paper is to analyze 
luxury companies’ key financial performance indicators and to compare them with those of 
groups from other sectors , thus assessing the validity of the luxury sector attractiveness 





The paradox of the luxury industry 
 
There is a luxury industry paradox. Luxury captures the attention from the financial 
community, from business analysts, Investment Banks. The world economic press regularly 
presents a focus on this sector and its main actors, be they multi-brands Groups such as 
LVMH, Richemont, PPR, Pernod-Ricard, or independent companies such as Bulgari, Prada, 
Armani, Burberry, Ralph Lauren,…. 
This is odd when it is reminded that the luxury sector is indeed quite small. According to Bain 
& Co, a leading consulting company specialized on this sector, the 2009 global luxury 
revenues amount to 153 Billion Euros. This estimate is based on the sum of the revenues of 
200 companies and brands which can be called luxury. This last figure should be compared to 
the net sales of Wal-Mart (291 Billion Euros) or that of the FMCG heavyweight champion : 
Procter and Gamble (59 Billion Euros).  
 
Why then all this fuss about an industry, fragmented into a myriad of small brands, the whole 
representing  just  half  the sales of the largest world mass retailer? Is it because these brands 
are so prestigious and have gained worldwide recognition and fascination? Is it because the 
financial community itself is the core target of these luxury brands and thus cannot remain 
neutral vis à vis names which exert such strong seductive power on them?  
  6
It is classic to hear that the reason lies elsewhere: luxury would in fact be a financiers’ dream. 
Luxury brands would be extremely profitable, and as such, they merit special attention. In a 
recent interview, B Arnault , LVMH ‘s CEO made it still more straight :  “ Luxury is the only 
sector that can provide luxurious margins “ ( Capital, May 2010 )  
 
The problem is that the luxury sector as a whole is quite opaque. Public companies try to hide 
as much as possible brand informations behind aggregated branch data . The many family 
companies do not publish any data .  The allusion to an extreme profitability is close to a 
rumor, that is to say an alleged information widely circulating among financial analysts, but 
still needing to be verified  (Kapferer , 1990). The sustained belief in the high profitability of 
the sector may be fueled by the very high prices luxury goods command and the impressive 
multiples used by retailers between wholesale and consumer prices. Not to speak of the gap 
between the retail price -often criticized as exaggerated- and the hypothesized cost of goods. 
This pushes people to believe that intangible elements, such as prestige, can boost prices to 
the sky at little cost thus leading to unusual profits.  
Another source of the widely circulating belief of luxury as one of the most profitable sectors 
could come from history. It may have been the case yesterday, far less nowadays, but the 
story still receives widespread belief today.   
 
It is time to look at this question today: is luxury really a financial dream?  
The data do exist, coming from Groups such as LVMH, the luxury sector world leader, or 
other public groups such as Richemont, Pernod-Ricard or L’Oréal which must publish each 
quarter their financial results. However, in this sector, there still is a vast number of family 
owned, non public companies and brands which are totally secretive about their performance 
(Chanel, Prada, ….). As a rule, the luxury sector does not like to talk much about the  7
corporate side of its activity, especially financial results. The objective is to maintain the 
mystique. Would the reader appreciate as much the food at A.Ducasse or J.Robuchon 
restaurants if he/she knew the gross margin and operating profits of their business? Can one 
be admirative of their financial performance and still have a neutral look at their price list? 
What is the taste of their EBITDA?    
In addition, even public Luxury Groups cultivate mystery. LVMH rarely presents financial 
results by brand but by branch. As a consequence, one has to rely on insiders’ information to 
guess the profits of each brand.  
 
This article explores in depth the profitability of the luxury sector. Its sources are the annual 
reports and all types of published information. Its aim is to put luxury into a comparative 
perspective and to foster more research on this topic. We have selected data from the 2008 
fiscal year, almost a normal one, for 2009 has been an exceptional one ,  due to the economic 
recession which badly hit most of luxury companies .  
 
 
The dream of the capital markets 
 
It is now evident that, in our modern economies, companies do consider shareholders as their 
most important stakeholders. This does not mean other stakeholders are not taken into 
account (managers, employees, consumers, bankers, society as a whole) but, to ensure the 
funding of the company, shareholders must be seduced.  
To satisfy them, management has to create value: shareholders do not look so much for 
dividends but want to see their share value growing. They expect management to design 
strategies as to increase their company’s value.   8
Companies can be seen as cash flow generating machines. Shareholders ask themselves 
regularly how long will those machines be producing cash flows and what will be the level of 
these cash flows in the future. Of course there is an inherent risk there: the future is mute. In 
fact we do not know the future, we can just predict it, guesstimate it. Certainly, past 
accounting figures do help making up forecasts, but the past is not a valid predictor of the 
future in modern dynamic and turbulent markets. Also,  companies’ turn-around strategies 
precisely aim at transforming a looser into a winner. 
If shareholders do not know the future, they have to imagine it, to invent it. The financial 
market is the place where all the hopes concur. Finance is not so much about numbers; it is 
about emotions and dreams. Interestingly, the word dream is also at the heart of the 
comprehension of how luxury works among clients: luxury brands do propose products, 
services and symbols which embed the dream of a luxury life : the ordinary of extraordinary 
people and the extraordinary of ordinary people ( Kapferer and Bastien, 2009) . This 
possibility to access to a dreamed life through possession of luxury items or by experiencing a 
unique luxury moment is at the heart of the growth of the luxury business; luxury prices are 
the measure of the intensity of people’s desire to reach this dream. Luxury companies CEO’s 
know they have to build their brands in order to make their clients dream, hence generate high 
future cashflow. This in turn that will create big hopes from the capital market; shareholders 
will dream about the future and share values will surge. 
 
We already come to a first conclusion: in Luxury, consumers’ dream is the source of 
shareholders’ dream. The more a brand evokes status, glamour, seduction, exceptional 
quality, prestigious clients, the more it can make the consumer market dream and command 
high prices and mark ups. If, in addition, the company has built trust amongst the financial 
community through a steady and consistent delivery of exciting quarterly results, then capital  9
markets are going to dream about this brand. For shareholders the future is more than bright: 
it becomes gold. 
 
Assessing the growth performance of luxury companies  
But, after the bet comes reality. Are luxury companies delivering outstanding performance? 
There are many performance indicators: sales growth, gross margin, operating profit, 
volatility and financial risk, cash flows amongst others. Let us analyse them all, one after the 
other. 
 
Our Luxury industry sample includes only publicly traded companies for which we have 
publicly disclosed financial information. Amongst what are considered luxury companies 
(Xerfi, 2007), we have selected a sample of the 12 companies with the largest revenues. This 
corresponds to roughly 60% of what is considered to be the world market sales of luxury 
articles, 170 to 180 billion Euros in 2008. 
TABLE 1. Luxury groups Sales (Fiscal Year 2008) 
















Table 1 shows the revenue distribution in the sample. Three heavyweights stand out, PPR SA 
(formerly known as Pinault-Printemps-Redoute), l’Oréal and LVMH (Louis-Vuitton-Moet- 10
Henessy). It may not be a coincidence that the three of them are French. Each of these 
companies regroups numerous brands, some of them being independently traded, but we 
generally have little specific financial information for each brand. Other companies are 3 to 
15 times smaller typical of an industry still largely fragmented. 
 
 
A first key performance indicator is the sales growth rate. Table 2 provides us with luxury 
companies’ average growth over the past 5 years (2004-2008). The luxury sector grew by an 
average 7.5 % per year. Nothing exceptional: other sectors’ average growth varied from 4% to 
12% (Reuters financial data). It is similar to the non-cyclical consumer goods and services 
sector and is slightly lower than the FMCG sector heavyweight, Procter and Gamble, 8.5%. 
Pernod-Ricard, the wine and spirit producer and distributor, certainly stands out with a 17% 
growth rate but this is mainly due to the acquisition of Allied Domecq (2005) and its 
acquisition of other premium brands. In any case the Luxury industry is definitely not 
competing with the technology leaders such as Google (50%) or Apple (30%). In terms of 
growth the luxury industry doe not appear as a financial market dream. 
 

















Is Luxury a low risk industry? 
Financial markets usually measure the market risk of a stock as its sensitivity to market 
swings. The degree of correlation between stock and market returns, known as the beta 
coefficient (Brealey, Myers and Allen, 2008), is a good indicator of the market risk.  
A beta of one would indicate that the stock follows exactly the market. If the beta is lower 
than one it means that the stock dampens the market swings. In other words, it has a lower 
volatility that the market and is considered has having a low risk. On the contrary, a higher 
than-one beta stock amplifies the maket swings and is thus considered as a high-risk stock. 
Analyses by Xerfi and Roland Berger (2006) showed that the luxury sector is characterized by 
a relatively low market risk; certainly global luxury sales do go up or down with the GDP 
evolution, but alledgedly not so much. We all have in mind Hermès being able to post a 15 % 
increase in sales in 2009, right in the middle of the crisis. The picture is more mixed when 
looking at luxury firms’ betas. Many of them have a below one beta like Richemont, 0.7, 
L’Oréal, 0.8, or Hermès, 0.9, indicating a low market risk. But their betas are still higher than 
low-risk companies such Coca-Cola, 0.6, and Wal-Mart, 0.5. Also, some firms exhibit quite 
high betas like Ralph Lauren, 1.8, and Tiffany, 1.7. A likely explanation for Ralph Lauren is  12
that it acts more as a fashion brand than a luxury one. Luxury brands sell great classics and 
iconic products which are perceived by clients as long term investments, a sure value in 
periods of economic turmoil. There is no such iconic product at Ralph Lauren. The same 
holds true for Tiffany. 
 
One could argue than the globalization of luxury business should lead to lower risk; by selling 
in all continents luxury companies and houses do balance the risks (Chadrah and Husband, 
2006). When the USA stopped buying luxury items in 2009, Asia was still in love with 
luxury. Though isnt’it the same for most industries? Also, don’t we see all markets becoming 
more and more correlated? In any case, the luxury sector does not really stands out in terms of 
low market riskiness. 
 
Looking at financial performance  
Let us now turn to financial performance indicators. The Income Statement provides the 
Gross Margin, the firm’s ability to mark-up its products and the Operating Profit or EBIT 
(Earnings Before Interest and Taxes), the most commonly used profitability figure. The Cash 
Flow from Operations, the amount of cash generated by the business, is drawn from the Cash 
Flow Statement. Finally, the Balance Sheet provides the Debt to Equity ratio, measuring the 
firm’s level of indebtness, which is a good indicator of financial risk.  
 
Taking LVMH as an example, and the 2008 fiscal year (that is to say before the economy 
went into full recession), the world leading luxury group posted revenues of 17,193 million 











      TABLE 3. LVMH  Income Statement, Fiscal Year 2008 
 
Revenues      17,193 
Cost of sales                       -    6,012 
Gross Profit         11,181       (Gross Margin = 65 %)  
Operating expenses            -     7,696 
EBIT (Operating Profit)          3,485      (Return On Sales = 20.3 %) 
Net exceptionnal items       -         41 
Net interest                          -       240 
Taxes                                    -      893 
Net Income          2,311      (Ratio = 13.4 %)  
 
Percentage ratios such Gross Margin, ROS and Net Icome % are useful indicators to compare 
profitabilities within a sector and between sectors. 
  14
It can be seen from Table 4 that the luxury sector exhibits a very high Gross Margin as a 
percentage of sales, a 62 % average in 2008. This is an impressive figure, acting as a sweet 
dream to financial analysts’ ears. This should not be a surprise: everyone knows that luxury 
good prices incorporate relatively little production costs. The price of luxury is by essence a 
discriminatory price: it aims at fulfilling the sociological function of luxury. 
 























There is luxury because many people cannot afford it. Luxury core function is to act as a 
social stratifyer . Luxury pricing is also called Veblen pricing , for demand grows as price 
goes up. It exploits the logic of externalities. In conspicuous consumption (Veblen, 1899), a 
key consumer segment (often called the « snobs ») derives value from uniqueness, and 
exclusivity (Groth and McDaniel, 1993). The snob’s value for a product decreases as the 
number of people who buy the product increases (Amaldoss and Jain, 2005 (a); Amaldoss and 
Jain, 2005 (b)). As a result, snobs are ready to pay more to contemplate less people being able 
to buy the same item.   15
 
Conformists just act the other way round:  they desire to look like everybody.  Their value for 
a product increases as the number of people who buy the product increases. This 
segmentation has important financial consequences: snobs exhibit less price elasticity or even 
positive price elasticity. As a result, unlike usual firms, the luxury firm should focus on 
maximizing its prices and margins instead of looking after market share domination.  
 
This segmentation also explains why Asia is luxury brands’ present gold mine. Chadah and 
Husband (2006) have pointed out that Asia was in love with luxury. There is a cult of the 
luxury brand, leading to extreme behaviors such as Shibuya school girls in Japan prostituting 
themselves to be able to buy a 700 Euros Louis Vuitton bag. These authors claim that « a 
staggering 94 % percent of Tokyo women in their 20’s own a Louis Vuitton piece » (2006, 
page 1).  
How can one explain such luxury fever? One hypothesis would be that, in a continent where 
personal reputation is an obsession as well as face saving, no one wants to be perceived as 
visibly  inferior to others: it would be the case if he/she seems unable to afford the well 
known signs of « being a respected person », that is, luxury brands with their logos. 
Asian conformists, the majority of people, hate non conformity above all, to a point where 
they are ready to pay a disproportionate price (vs their own revenues) to stay in-group. As a 
result, Asian snobs must themselves buy the highest priced items of the most prestigious 
brands to get rid of the conformists, who will abandon the social pursuit after a certain level 
of price is reached.  
  16
The social dynamics of luxury explain why accessible luxury is a short term view if one 
wants to stay in the luxury business. High prices, sustained by the prestige of the brand, make 
the products more desirable for the brand prestige endows the buyer with aura.  
This is why, as prices go up, so does the ratio price/cost of goods. The luxury sector 62 % 
average gross margin reflects that situation. 
 
Building prestige for luxury brands is lengthy and costly: prestige is fragile and can be 
quickly lost. For instance Kort & al. (2006) demonstrated how a price discount policy dilutes 
brand prestige. Jaguar was sold to the Indian Tata by Ford Corporation because it could not 
charge high prices anymore; its prestige had been diluted by the repeated introduction of new 
accessible models.  
Luxury sells access to a dream of exclusivity, identification with exceptional people and their 
rich life style but it also sells the possession of products with high intensity of labor, art, 
spirit, quality and sensuality. This dream building needs important communication and 
operating expenses such as the costs of staging exceptional fagship stores in the best streets of 
the world capital cities.  
 
Table 5 looks at remaining earnings once all costs to bring the product to the consumer -
R&D, Selling, General and Administrative expenses- are subtracted from the Gross Margin. It 
actually presents the ratio known as Return on Sales (ROS = EBIT / Sales). The luxury 
industry exhibits an average 13 % ratio. The clear leader is Hermès with a remarkable 25 % 
ROS, while many other brands do seem to overspend or to spend with less efficiency: their 
Return on Sales could be as little as 5 %.  
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The case of Hermès has been already analyzed in depth .This  company is following a pure 
luxury strategy with all the constituents of the luxury business model : full control of the 
value chain, own stores, no licenses, no delocalization of production, worship of the product, 
products partly hand-made, importance of creation, capitalization on heritage and history, 
etc… . It is no surprise that this company was the only one to see its sales increase in 2009, 
right during the recession: its revenues grew by 8.5% (4.1% at constant exchange rates).  
Pernod Ricard fares very well also: this is the result of a steady and consistent trading up or 
premiumization policy. This is witnessed by the fact that this major Spirits and Wine Group 
(N° 2 in the world ) did  purchase along the years major world icons such as Chivas, Martell, 
Mumm, Perrier Jouët, Royal Salute, The Glenlivet, Ballantines, Jameson, Beefeeter and most 
recently Absolut Vodka.   18
One clearly sees a gap between gross margin average ratio (62 %) and average ROS (13 %): 
the rumor of luxury as a financiers’ dream seems based more on Gross Margin than EBIT, the 
profitability once the costs of consumer dream building are deducted. 
 
Table 6 adds an element of comparison. It presents profitability figures for the luxury group 
sample over five years (from 2004 till 2008 included) as well as those of the “Most Powerful 
Brands” as defined by the MillwardBrown brand ranking (MillwardBrown, 2008 and 2009). 
The top 5 brands included at that time: Google, Microsoft, Coca-Cola, IBM and McDonald’s. 
We also add in the table Procter and Gamble, the reference company in the Consumer Good 
sector and Wal-Mart stores, the largest retailer in the world (13
th in MillwardBrown ranking).  
    





Table 6 confirms that the luxury sector does stand out in terms of gross margin (see above Bar 
chart using the left scale). Only Microsoft exhibits a far reaching 81% gross margin. This is  19
because it won the battle of the norms (Windows), thus building a position of quasi monopoly 
among PC softwares. Microsoft can charge monopoly prices without much fear of letting a 
challenger enter the market by cutting prices. Google and Coca Cola also present high gross 
margin figures. At this time Google is also a quasi monopoly in the internet search market. 
Coca Cola, outside the USA, is fully dominating its sector through an extended distribution 
network, Pepsi Cola lagging far behing and sometimes being even absent of some countries. 
Though, neither of them can compete with the best luxury performers. 
 
L’Oréal Group exhibits an impressive 70 % gross margin. L’Oréal sells a variety of brands: 
luxury brands (Lancôme, Elizabeth Arden), premium brands (Biotherm, Kiehl’s,...),  mass 
prestige brands (Maybelline, L’Oréal Paris) and even local heroes (strong local brands). In 
L’Oréal case, a key factor of success is its segmentation by channel of distribution (selective 
stores, pharmacies, hairdressors, supermarkets,...). Brands are specialized by channel of 
distribution. This hides a large cost cutting transversality at the production level: sameness of 
ingredients, molecules, chemical formulas as well as of packagings creates large economies of 
scale, not to speak of the common R&D centers and the mass media discounts obtained from 
Group purchases. Finally hair, skin care and make up are emotional categories; women’s self 
confidence is boosted by the premium price they pay as exemplified by L’Oréal long lasting 
slogan: ‘because I am worth it’.  
All other companies in our sample, although they are leaders in their field and top brands do 
not fare as well. One remarks that the reference of the industry, Procter and Gamble, reaches 
only 51.4% which roughly corresponds to the industry average, 49.5%. Even IBM the leader 
of its sector fetches about 42% with most other companies showing gross margin ratios below 
30%.  20
Evidence thus seems to point that the luxury industry is able to leverage its aura into above 
average mark-ups competing neck to neck with the most profitable businesses. With respect 
to gross margin we may conclude that the luxury industry is a dream machine. 
 
Now, if one looks at the ROS indicator, as represented by the red line in Table 6 (using the 
right hand scale), the story appears quite different. One cannot conclude that the luxury 
industry has any advantage. The average ROS for the luxury industry over the last 5 years, 
14.2%, is about the same than the average ROS for the Consumer Goods industry, 13.5%. 
The results are the same if we compute the weighted ROS where the ROS are weighted by the 
firms’ revenues; firms’ size does not affect the findings. When comparing the luxury average 
to the ROS from the non luxury sub-sample, almost all firms beat this average. 
Just for the record, Hermes’ much hyped profitability is equivalent to Coca-Cola’s; 
Richemont owner of Cartier has the same profitability than IBM.  
Our ealier finding showing the rumor of luxury as a financiers’ dream seems to be based more 
on gross margin than EBIT is confirmed: sheer profitability, measured by ROS, is not so 
exciting. Per se the luxury industry is not exceptional. 
 
 
What level of financial risk?  
Looking at the 2008 balance sheet of LVMH one can compute the company’s financial 
leverage (Total Debt / Equity): 5,860 / 12,804 million euros that is to say 46 %. 46% of 
LVMH financing came from bank loans or bond issues. Contrary to funds provided by 
shareholders, borrowed money has to be reimbursed and it bears an interest rate. The higher 
the debt, the higher the interest rate expenses and therefore the higher the possibility that the  21
company is not able, when bad times come, to generate enough cash flows to pay for its 
interest charge: the company is bankrupt. Financial markets acknowledge this financial risk.  
According to their interest coverage, that is the amount of interest to be paid compared to 
their cash flows, companies are given a financial rating, from AAA, investment grade, to BB, 
junk debt. The interest rate charged will largely depend on that rating. This is crucial in 
turbulent times, as we have seen over the last 2 years. In 2008, the interest rate difference 
between AAA and BB companies was close to 9%. Financial risk will therefore have a 
definite impact on the firm’s profitability and its capacity to excite the markets. We have 
recently seen, with Greece, violent markets reaction to too high level of debt: it almost 
crashed the Euro zone. The situation is quite similar with companies. 
 
On average, our sample luxury companies show moderate leverage, many of them below 
20%, see Table 7, the financial leverage appearing as a bar chart (with the left scale).This 
should be compared to the 35% average leverage in the Consumer Goods industry. Luxury 
companies have a low financial risk.  Only Pernod Ricard with a financial leverage of 96% 
stands out.  This is the result of its aggressive external growth policy:  to migrate upscale, it 
had to finance through borrowing the acquisition of world blockbusters. 
 
If one plots on the same graph the cash rate, which is the cash as a percentage of sales, as it 
appears in Table 7 as a red line (with the right scale), our above conclusion is reinforced. 
Actually, half of the luxury groups have a low financial leverage and a high cash rate; 
Hermès, Swatch Group, Armani, Ralph Lauren and Richemont: they hold onto plenty of cash, 
a virtue which will be most appreciated in the following year when, because of the recession, 
cash will be scarce. Estee Lauder which has a high leverage, 86%, has at the same time a high 
cash rate indicating idle cash reserves which could be easily mobized if needed be. Except for  22
Pernod-Ricard all of our luxury firms have a fairly low financial risk. Two possible 
explanations: luxury firms need little funding because of slow growth or do they generate so 
much cash that they are able to cover their financing need? This is what we will investigate in 
the next paragraph. 
        
 





Are luxury companies cash machines?  
The ability to generate strong Cash Flows from Operations (CFO) is provided by the Cash 
Flow Statement. Cash flow from operation is equal to Cash Earnings minus the increase in 
Net Working Capital, that is the cash tied up to operate the business. What is at stake here is 
the firm’s capacity to convert earnings into cash. As we are all well aware of, earnings do not 
necessarily mean cash. A profitable company overshooting the demand for its products will 
constitute large inventories; because the company is profitable, the Income Staement will  23
show positive earnings but the company could be cash short since it has to pay for the 
production costs of products sitting on the shelf. 
 
Table 8 compares the cash flow rates (CFO/Sales) from luxury groups with those of our Top 
Brands sample. It clearly shows that the luxury industry doesn’t seem to be extracting the last 
nickel from their operations. It is by-passed by all non luxury companies. Even the very 
profitable Hermes has an average CFO rate. The average luxury CFO rate (weighted by sales 
or not), 14%, is even smaller than the industry reference P&G, 18%. In any case, luxury 
groups do not fare so well in comparison with Google, an almost 40 % CFO rate, or even 
Coca-Cola, 26%.  






























How come luxury companies do such a great job at generating gross margin and fail to 
generate substantial cash flow?   24
It may be inherent to the luxury industry and not necessarily due to a lack of efficiency. One 
should remember that to act as a luxury company, one should go beyond standards and 
expectations in terms of quality, creativity, luxuriousness, communication etc…. Classical 
cost-efficient marketing promotional techniques used by mass brands will definitely reduce 
the level of creativity and exuberance which creates the gap between luxury brands and its 
many imitators trying to copy luxury brands communication codes. The etymology of luxury 
is the Latin ‘luxus’ which refers to freedom, the absence of constraints, the capacity to reach 
extremes and to indulge in excesses. Would luxury companies still belong to luxury if they 
were driven by cost-containment controllers?  
 
Are Haute Couture defilés too expensive? Is the price paid by Cartier to have the incredible 
right to exhibit its own history and jewelry at the heart of The Forbidden City in Beijing too 
high? How should we measure the return on investment knowing that China will be the N° 1 
luxury market in twenty years from now and already accounts for 50 % of the world luxury 
market growth? Those are difficult questions to answer but one never aims too high to 
communicate the implicit hierarchy between prestige brands; some brands have heritage, 
others just have a story telling ability. Luxury is the business of status: it has to be acquired 
and proven by the ambition and extravagance in everything the luxury brand does.  
 
 
Does the financial market dream?  
From the above analyses, the luxury industry: 
- has an average growth, 
- seems to help weathering market swings (below-one betas), 
- has high gross margins,  25
- shows a below par profitability (ROS), 
- exhibits fairly low levels of financial risk (leverage),  
- generate comparatively weak cash flows. 
 
Is there then a unique luxury financial specificity? If yes, it should be found in the valuation 
multiples, the prices investors are ready to pay to benefit in the future from a Euro of Earnings 
(Price Earnings Ratio, PER) or a Euro of Cash flow (Price to Cash Flow, P/CF). 
 
Valuation Multiples 
When analyzing valuation ratios we decided not to use 2008 share prices. At that time, we 
were in the heart of the maëlstrom and most luxury share prices were badly punished. It 
seems that, surprised by the intensity of the crisis, financial markets did not believe in the 
luxury sector anymore; more basic consumer goods appeared to be a safer bet. Just for the 
record, let’s note that the share prices of LVMH, Swatch and Tiffany almost doubled between 
December 2008 and December 2009, when Procter and Gamble, Coca-Cola and Wall Mart 
did not see any change. Obviously valuation ratios were distorted. To be coherent, we used 
companies’ Fiscal year 2009 Financial Statements and share prices at the time of the closing 
of the fiscal year, usually December 31, 2009. 
 
Table 8 compares luxury and non luxury top brand companies in terms of Price Earning Ratio 
(PER), the most commonly used valuation multiple. The PER used are ‘Trailing Twelve 
Months’ (TTM) ratios as reported by Reuters Finance Stock Overview and double checked 




































Results are striking. Except for one, Pernod Ricard, all luxury companies exhibit a PER above 
20, when most non luxury brands have a PER below 17 (the PER for Shisheido and Bulgari 
were not available). The graph speaks for itself: luxury brands benefit from valuation 
multiples clearly above other brands, even though the latter are profitable and top names in 
their trade. One could argue that results may be biaised: could it be that luxury brands’ low 
profitability boosts their PER since low luxury earnings would mechanically biased PER 
upward? Two examples seem to indicate it is not the case. First Wal-Mart which we have  27
seen has quite a low profitability commands just a PER of 14. On the other end Hermès, 
which enjoyed a very high profitability, has a PER of 38.  
Interesting also is the PER of Procter and Gamble, 17. This is not a luxury and the absence of 
dream factor is reflected in its PER. Also, Pernod Ricard does not seem to benefit from any 
dream factor; maybe the group is not considered yet as a truly luxury group.  
Two last remarks; first, Apple enjoys the same PER as luxury firms but one has to take into 
account the stunning success of its latest products, IPhone and IPad. PPR has a huge PER but 
in this case one believes it’s due to its low, almost negative, profitability; the ratio is of little 
significance. 
 
Even though the figures are really impressive, one would even argue that luxury PER are in 
fact downward biased; this is due to the reporting of most luxury groups.  
Luxury groups publish aggregate figures only: LVMH does not produce public information 
on each of its 50 brands. It is however well known that some of them are not profitable at all. 
B. Arnault, LVMH CEO, decided to divest personnally from Christian Lacroix after enduring 
10 unprofitable years. It means that, within the 50 brands of LVMH, or of any other luxury 
group, some brands must be extremely profitable as to offset the losses of all those in the red. 
Probably financial markets have difficulties to dissecate the results and fully integrate the 
dream on the most profitable brands.  
 
The above argument would rightly push luxury groups to divest their lesser brands as to focus 
on the succesful ones. Obviously Hermés one-brand strategy supports this approach, its PER 
of 38 speaks for itself. We would argue quite the contrary.  
In nowaday’s turbulent world with ever shorter product cycle, it is very difficult for a luxury 
brand manager to feel secure about the future. As argued above the appeal of a brand is  28
essentially emotional and therefore volatile. This is the essence of the trade: what is utmostly 
desired today could be totally ignored tomorrow. How long will Louis Vuitton bags generate 
one hour waiting queues on the sidewalk in the center of Roma? Of course the prestige of a 
luxury brand helps extending the engine life but brand cemeteries are everyday more full.  
 
Facing such a situation, encountered also in many other industries (Technology, 
Pharmaceutical and of course Consumer Goods) experts have argued that firms should 
manage simultaneously exploitation and exploration, (Saias and Tabatoni, 2003). Firms 
should achieve excellence in day to day operation as to maximize earnings and cash flows 
but, at the same time, prepare for the future by exploring new ventures, in the case of the 
luxury industry building up new brands (or reviving old brands). Clearly, companies will not 
want to advertise too much their costly exploring activities to avoid financial markets 
frustration and run the risk to have to abandon initiatives before they bear fruit. The industry 
is rich in fairy tales of such brand turn-over. After all, the fortune of Mr Arnault, the sixth 
richest man in the world according to Forbes, February 2010, is basically due to the fact that 
he once acquired the control of a quite small company manufacturing luggage and leather 
goods, called Louis Vuitton. Later he also bought Dior, an ailing company at that time.  
Many multi brand luxury groups seem to have chosen that path with much success: LVMH, 
Pernod Ricard, PPR and Richemont amongst others.  
 
One unintended consequence will then be a concentration trend of the industry. It has been 
argued at length that little synergies could be expected from multi brand groups except for 
media buying, retail channel pooling and negotiating power with mass retailers. In fact the 
competitive advantage of large multi brand groups comes from their ability to finance 
exploration. Transforming a boutique brand into a global blockbuster necessitates huge  29
investment and competences that only large groups will have. Also, their access cost to 
financing will be much lower. This has been recently advocated by Bain & Co consultant 
which predicts the luxury industry to “be set for a new wave of mergers, acquisitions and 
IPO’s as the industry recovers from its worst year ever”, Businessweek, 2010.  
Finally having in the pipe a portfolio of future brands provides some additional strategic 
flexibility. Such flexibility confers to its holder a growth option which has been shown to add 
much value to the firm (O. Tabatoni, 2010). Once those embeded options better recognized by 
stock markets, one could expect an extra boost to their multiples. 
 
Profitable Growth 
To isolate the profitability factor, one has used another measure of firms’ dream power, 
namely the Price to Sales ratio, P/S. This ratio indicates how much financial markets are 
ready to pay for one Euro of sales. A high ratio attests to the excitement generated by the firm 
with investors. At first sight, one sees that most luxury groups have a P/S ratio between 2 and 
3. This is an encouraging result when one compares to the S&P 500 with a P/S ratio slightly 
less than 2. A few exceptions though: Hermès has a 5.2 Price to Sales ratio, but we are now 
used to Hermès’ extraordinary performance. On the other end of the spectrum lie PPR, 
Shisheido and Ralph Lauren. Those companies do not seem to enjoy much dream power. 
Either financial market do not consider them as real luxury company, Shisheido and Ralph 
Lauren, or not yet there, in the case of PPR. 
However, luxury companies pale in comparison to other MillwardBrown Top Brand 
companies:  4 out of 6 enjoy the highest P/S ratio. This simple analysis seems to contradict 
our previous findings. Some additional considerations may be necessary to better grasp luxury 
specificity. 
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Luxury groups, as any company, will make the market dream if they exceed shareholders 
expectations. Which are they? 
To invest in the shares of a young enterprise, shareholders would expect more than a mere 3% 
; such a return could be obtained by investing in Government Bonds. This is the centrepiece 
of a ‘finance mind’: investors’ expected return, called Cost of Capital, should be in line with 
the risk taken. But, if a firm wants to have investors dreaming, it should devise strategies 
which generate returns above the Cost of Capital, strategies which deliver positive Economic 
Profitability; today, all CFO’s are telling us that they have to “beat” their Cost of Capital. At 
the same time, to preserve their market share and profitability and to attract new investors 
firms have to grow. Those two imperatives have been coined in the commonly used 
expression, Profitable Growth.  
This is summarized by the diagram below. It stresses the fact that profitability and growth 
should be simultaneously present for value to be created. The gray area representing the 
amount of value created will be very small if the firm does not deliver on one axis. 
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FIGURE 1 : Profitable growth 
 
Only those firms which generate Profitable Growth should enjoy a high Price to Sales ratio. 
Then, if luxury firms did not generate Profitable Growth and still have a high P/S ratio it 
would mean that luxury firms are exciting financial markets beyond their financial 
performance, the true sign of a capacity to make the markets dream. 
 
We did not possess any reliable information for the firms’ cost of capital. Given the low level 
of leverage of most of our luxury firms (except Pernod-Ricard) and a priori similar business 
risk we have decided to neutralize the cost of capital; we will then use the EBIT as measure of 
profitability.  
To achieve more reliable results and to avoid the December 2008 valuation trough which 
might be distorting the data, one has used 5-year averages for Growth and EBIT over the 
2005-2009 period. 
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Table 10 relates our sample companies’ Price to Sales ratios with their 5-year profitability and 
growth ratios. Price to Sales are represented by the blue circles; the larger the circle, the 
higher the Price to Sales ratio. 
 
In the shaded square one finds the bulk of the luxury firms. Their growth is moderate, less 
than 10% and their profitability between 10% and 20%. Though, they all have a Price to Sales 
ratio superior to 2 a ratio clearly higher than the 1.5 average for the industry. No other firm is 





















able to reach that level of P/S ratio without having a far superior profitability, Microsoft and 
Coca Cola, or growth, Apple and Google. Also, very successful non luxury firms do not fetch 
better P/S ratios although they exhibit higher growth, IBM, or higher profitability, 
MacDonalds.  
Even if we look at the bottom left part of the Graph, where we have the three firms with low 
profitability and low growth, PPR, Shisheido and Wal-Mart, both luxury firms have a higher 
P/S ratio than Wal-Mart although they exhibit much less growth. Given PPR and Shisheido 
low M/S, one may question wether financial markets are considering those firms as belonging 
to the luxury sector. Also one may question whether PPR is pure luxury play. FNAC and 
Conforama, two of its best known brands, are definitely not in the luxury segment and Puma, 
a worldwide sports brand, is not either. Shisheido is a luxury brand in Europe, but not so 
much in Asia which still represented 78% of its sales in 2009. 
 
The same argument could be extended to two other firms. With substantial growth, more than 
10%, Ralph Lauren is not able to reach a P/S ratio of 2. Ralph Lauren does not seem to 
benefit from any luxury premium. Also, Pernod Ricard has a P/S ratio of 2.2 but to achieve it, 
P-R had to deliver 18% growth and an average 22% profitability. Financial markets seem to 




Our findings about the luxury industry can be easily summarized: although one has not found 
a defining specificity in terms of operational performance except for high gross margin, 
however a dream factor seems to operate with financial markets ; PER and P/S ratios testify  34
to it. Luxury groups enjoy clearly superior valuation multiples which could not be justified on 
the basis of shareholders expectations in terms growth and profitability. 
 
A factor very known from casino gamblers seems to be influencing the financial community  : 
the fact that some of the luxury companies do attain exceptional results acts as fuel for  the 
dream . In addition , it is well known that , within LVMH ,world  N°1 luxury group with more 
than 50 brands , one of them alone -Louis Vuitton -  contributes disproportionately to the 
profitability of the Group , offsetting the still poor results of many other brands of their 
portfolio . The same holds true for Richemont whose financial results rely mostly on the 
Cartier brand itself . But  there is still a widespread belief in the potential of all others . Just as 
L Vuitton was a small company when B. Arnault ( LVMH founder ) fully bought it  in 1989 
and has now become the star of the whole sector , everyone  believes that each luxury brand 
will have its chance if properly managed . One should simply emulate their luxury strategy . 
Another factor today sustains this dream: luxury companies are just sitting at the edge of a 
huge growth potential, named China and India , Brazil , Russia. The size of their middle class 
will make these countries dominant markets for luxury companies : aspirations to compete for 
status have just been released there. They will be the main markets of tomorrow:  when 
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